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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendants strongly object to Plaintiffs' attempts to
"reframe" the issues which Defendants, as Appellants, have
presented to this Court.

Plaintiffs complain that the statement

of Defendants' issues on appeal is "imprecise" and "incomplete"
because Defendants refuse to subscribe to Plaintiffs'
exaggerated, puffing version of the evidence.
The issues raised in this appeal are legal issues —

not

factual challenges based upon an insufficiency of evidence.

We

have marshalled objectively and fairly all of that evidence
relevant to determine the issues of law presented by Defendants
for this Court's review.

Plaintiffs wish to "reframe" the issues

only because they would have this appeal be something other than
what it is.
Apparently recognizing that this Court's review of
Defendants' issues is plenary and without deference to the
trial court's erroneous rulings, Plaintiffs have attempted to
manipulate and alter the scope and purpose of the appeal by
fabricating "straw" issues of fact.

After dressing up these

"straw" dummies, Plaintiffs then attack them as though these
dummy issues had been created by Defendants.
Appellants who seek review of claims and issues raised and
preserved in the trial court possess the prerogative to frame
these issues to be decided as they choose, regardless of
appellees' vain efforts to alter those issues.
Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992).
-1-

Yee v. City of

Appellants control the

scope of the questions presented and may frame them as broadly
or as narrowly as seems fitting.

Id.

And, the facts stated and

the arguments argued in Appellants' brief are properly within the
framework of Appellants' issues.
Simply restating the issues as we have framed them, the
trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to enforce
the clear and unambiguous release provisions of the Redemption
Agreement, which released all known and unknown claims between
the parties.

Plaintiffs attempt to convert this issue into a

factual maze by claiming fraudulent inducement of the Redemption
Agreement, arguing that there was no intent to release the
instant claims. As shown in Appellants' Brief, and admitted by
Plaintiffs, there is no evidence that, during the partnership,
Defendants ever said anything regarding the nature and
construction of the pavilion crypts, or otherwise acted to
fraudulently induce the settlement release.
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it allowed
Plaintiffs' unrestricted reference to and evidence of Defendants'
financial condition and wealth.

Had there been any desire on the

part of the trial court to accord Defendants fundamental fairness
and due process at the trial, that court would have followed the
mandates of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-1(2) (1992) and required
a finding of liability before allowing such irrelevant and
prejudicial information to be repeatedly stressed and paraded
before the jury.
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Additionally, Defendants charge that the award of nearly two
million dollars in punitive damages is excessive and results from
the jury's passion and prejudice.

That passion and prejudice has

been consistently injected into this case by the trial court's
rulings and by Plaintiffs' supercilious, venomous hyperbole.
We submit that Appellants, and not Plaintiffs, have properly
framed the issues in this appeal for this Court's review.

This

Court should not be dissuaded from the legitimate issues by
Plaintiffs' "non-issues."
STATEMEMT QF FACTS
While purporting to "marshal" the evidence, Plaintiffs'
Appellees' Brief persists in taking unwarranted liberties in its
representations and recharacterization of the evidence, which
are frequently unsupportable by the record.

Appellees' brief is

rife throughout with unsupported overstatement and inappropriate
personal attack.

We submit that Appellants' statement of facts

is objective and responsible, whereas Plaintiffs appear bent on
vindictive destruction.
As we have noted, this appeal focuses upon legal issues and
not upon the fanciful characterizations advanced by Plaintiffs.
Even though these mischaracterizations are not relevant to the
issues herein, we do respond briefly in this reply brief.

Only

a few of Appellees' creative impressions can be discussed here.
Plaintiffs consistently over-embellish, and create "redherrings," such as captiously referring to the pavilion crypts

-3-

as stacked, flimsy crates.1

If such emotional impressions are

indicative of Plaintiffs' view of the evidence, then such view
is neither circumspect nor caredible. As shown by the following
examples, this Court must cautiously review the trial transcript
before placing any credence in the mischaracterizations and
misimpressions that pervade Plaintiffs' brief,
THE OUTDOOR CRYPTS WERE NOT MISREPRESENTED
TO GOVERNMENT1 OFFICIALS OR OTHERS.
Plaintiffs falsely claim that architect Fluckiger originally
designed concrete crypts for the outdoor pavilions; and, that Mr.
Garner secured a construction permits only on that basis, but
then furtively concealed from the government, and others, that
the crypts were made of wood rather than concrete.,

(Appellees'

Brief at 6-9). However, as shown by an objective view of the
record, local government approval of the outdoor pavilion
building plans was never dependent upon the use of concrete,
nor was anyone deceived when wood crypts were built.

^-No one at trial ever referred to the pavilion crypts as
"flimsy" or "stacked crates." We submit that the evidence does
not support the characterization overemphasized in Appellees'
brief (e.g. pp. 42, 55).
Although seemingly trivial, another typical example of
overstatement is Plaintiffs' mischaracterization of Dr. Burtis
Evans as Garner's "life-long" physician and study companion
(Appellees' Brief at 57). Dr. Evans did not even become
acquainted with Keith Garner until the 1970s - well after
Alldredge's "mission." (Tr. IX:4648; Exh. 34). Such minor
collateral misrepresentations are so plentiful throughout
Appellees' brief that they unavoidably detract from its
credibility.
-4-

Initially, in 1982, two years before the garden pavilions
were contemplated, architect Fluckiger designed a second-story
addition proposed for the indoor mausoleum building.
addition was never constructed.

That

(Tr. 111:3359-66, 3411A).

Because of the size of such an addition, the building code
required that construction be entirely of noncombustible
material.

(Tr. Ill:3411A-12).

At a 1982 variance hearing on

this addition for that add-on, indoor mausoleum structure, Mr.
Fluckiger submitted a brochure that described pre-cast concrete
crypts, or "DUWE" brand crypts.
45).

(Tr. 111:3378; IV:3426; Exh.

That hearing had nothing whatever to do with the later-

designed outdoor garden pavilions.
Two years later, in the spring of 1984, Fluckiger helped
obtain a separate variance from the Salt Lake City Board of
Adjustment to build the outdoor pavilions. The construction
material for the outdoor crypts was never discussed with the
Board.

(Tr. 111:3410).

The minutes of the Board's variance

hearing for the outdoor pavilions do not mention any material
with which those outdoor crypts were to be constructed.
44).

(Exh.

The only design document submitted by Defendants to Salt

Lake City in connection with obtaining variance approval was the
site plan, a preliminary version of what later became Exhibit 47.
(Tr. 111:3384, 3403-04).
After the variance was approved, Fluckiger later prepared
other "design" drawings which were submitted with the application
for a building permit.

(Exhs. 47-50; Tr. 111:3386-88, 3404).
-5-

Unlike the earlier indoor addition project, these 1984
drawings of the outdoor pavilions only detailed the design of the
exterior shells of the five pavilions.

(Tr. IV:3434).

The

drawings do not purport to detail the interior structure and
crypts within the shell, except generally to indicate their
configuration.

(Tr. 111:3390, 3404).

The pavilion crypts were actually designed in 1985 by the
contractor, Robert Ord.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, Mr. Ord

did not "depart'' from any architect's "plan" when he employed
wood in the crypts' construction at Mr. Garner's request.
Appellees' Brief at 8.

(Tr. IV:3518, 3527-28, 3530).

On his pavilion shell drawing, Exh. 49, Mr. Fluckiger had
noted "cone, crypts," merely as a holdover assumption from
his earlier design work on the abandoned plan for the indoor
addition.

However, he had never been asked by Mr. Garner to

design the crypts inside the pavilion shells or to specify their
construction material.

(Tr. 111:3393, 3404, 3410-11A).

Mr.

Fluckiger never discussed with Mr. Garner the material to be used
for the pavilion crypts.

Id.

These two "cryptic" words were

never intended by Mr. Fluckiger, or by Defendants, to represent
to Salt Lake City personnel the crypts' construction.

(Tr.

IV:3436).
Nor was the drawing so treated by Salt Lake City personnel.
Roger Evans, Director of Building and Housing Services for Salt
Lake City, testified that in approving, or later revoking, the
building permit for the outdoor pavilions, no reliance or
-6-

consideration was placed on any drawing description of concrete
crypts.

(Tr. VIII:4431-32).

Building the pavilion crypts out of

wood did not violate any building code.

(Tr. IV:3425, 3491-93).

However, Plaintiffs ballyhoo their charge that the building
permit for the outdoor pavilions was revoked in January, 1987 by
a building inspector who apparently believed that Board of Health
approval either was or might be necessary.

(Exh. 51, p. 3). In

fact, there was no Board of Health approval required and
Plaintiffs conceded there was no health requirement governing
the crypt construction.

(Tr. VIII:4434).

There was no testimony

from the building inspector why he sought to revoke the permit.
There was no evidence that notice of his "revocation" was ever
communicated to Garner or his contractor.

The trial court

refused to allow Mr. Evans to explain that the building inspector
had been in error.

(Tr. IV:3490-91).

of any government official.

There was no deception

It is very obvious from Exhibit 51

that the building inspector saw the wood crypts. He was not
deceived by what he saw.

Simply stated, Plaintiffs take

unjustified license with the facts by filling in their own
conclusions in the absence of any evidence.
Plaintiffs suggest sinister conspiracy because the contractor Mr. Ord had discarded his records of the outdoor crypt
construction, in 1989 when he moved his office.

(Appellees'

Brief at 8-9). However, no deceptive motive can reasonably be
attached because at that time Mr. Ord also threw out his personal
records of all his past jobs.

Mr. Ord merely threw away all of
-7-

his records, plans, drawings, etc. that he had accumulated for
all the jobs he had completed in the 14 years he had been in
Utah.

It is unfortunate that the records discarded included

the building of the pavilion crypts. Yet, none of the jobs were
"current" and Mr. Ord believed he would have no further use or
need for the records.

(Tr. IV:3515, 3554-56).

For Plaintiffs

to accuse Mr. Ord and Defendants of sinister complicity in
destroying his records is baseless and unjustifiably demeaning.
PLAINTIFFS' "ARGUMENT" THAT GARNER EXPECTED TO SAVE
OVER $400f000.00 BY BUILDING WOOD CRYPTS IS SPURIOUS.
Plaintiffs' contention that Garner sought to save over
$400,000.00 by building the crypts of wood, rather than concrete,
may be appealing at first blush but is, in fact, spurious and
founded upon unsupported guesswork.
This argument was discussed by Mr. Caldwell, Plaintiffs'
expert.

(Tr. VII:4168-72).

His conclusions are summarized in

Exhibit 89a (Attachment 1 to Brief of Appellees).

The first

problem with Exhibit 89a (and Defendants' argument) is the
assumption that the 1984 cost to construct outdoor crypts with
concrete would have been $582,500.00. This sum was assumed by
Mr. Caldwell based on his interpretation of Exhibit 52. Exhibit
52 (attached hereto in the Reply Addendum) is a handwritten,
cryptic note by Mr. Fluckiger wherein he guesstimates what he
thinks the pavilion crypts might cost, even before the detail
planning stage.

(Tr. VII:4169, 4177-79).
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Mr. Fluckiger's note was prepared on April 18, 1984, before
the variance hearing was held, and before any detailed drawings
were prepared on which the building permit for the pavilions was
based.

Fluckiger estimated that each pavilion shell, without

any crypts, would cost $40,000.00, or $200,000.00 for the five
inter-connected pavilions, without interior crypts.

The actual

total cost to build the outdoor pavilions, with crypts, was
$173,400.00.
Mr. Fluckiger also estimated, at the bottom of Exhibit 52,
that a pre-cast concrete crypt might cost $750.00 per crypt, or
$7 6,500.00 for the 102 crypts in each pavilion.

This price

information on a DUWE pre-cast crypt came from a brochure that
Mr. Fluckiger had obtained in 1982 when he designed a proposal
for the second-story addition to the main mausoleum building.
(Tr. 111:3377-78; IV:3426).
Exhibit 52 does not explain how this concrete crypt
pricing relates to any plans for or construction of the outdoor
pavilions, if at all. Mr. Fluckiger explained that Exhibit 52
was only "a very preliminary, sketchy analysis" comparing the
estimated cost of the exterior shell per pavilion ($40,000.00) to
a 1982 estimate for pre-cast concrete crypts ($7 6,500) that had
been considered for a proposed second-story addition to the main
mausoleum.

(Tr. 111:3396-98).

Mr. Caldwell did not hear Mr. Fluckiger's explanation of his
notations and did not talk to him concerning Exhibit 52. (Tr.
VII:4170).

Mr. Caldwell improperly assumed that pre-cast
-9-

concrete crypts were intended to be used at the outdoor pavilion.
That assumption was baseless because there was no evidence to
support it. Any use of the DUWE crypt system obviated the need
of any exterior shell, and the concrete crypts actually included
in the pavilions were poured in place and were not the DUWE
variety.

(Tr. VII:4179).

In spite of his flawed assumption, Mr.

Caldwell opined that the total cost of building the outdoor
pavilions, with concrete crypts, included the $40,000.00 (per
pavilion) for an all-reinforced concrete exterior shell, plus the
cost of the DUWE brand of pre-cast concrete crypts.
VII:4179).

(Tr.

We submit that such an opinion, without any factual

basis, cannot properly be claimed as "factual."
And, importantly, the record is totally devoid of any
evidence that Exhibit 52 or Mr. Fluckiger's calculations and
guesstimates were ever shared with Mr. Garner or ever came to his
attention.

His testimony that he never saw Exhibit 52 was not

contradicted.

(Tr. V:3694, 3696; VII:4179).

Plaintiffs cannot parlay Mr. Fluckiger's personal and
private notes into a factual claim that Mr. Garner built wood
crypts solely for profit.

For example, a change in the roof

design made the pavilions more expensive, not less.
111:3389; IV:3420).

(Tr.

There was no evidence as to the relative

costs of crypts made of poured-in-place concrete versus wood.
There was no properly-founded evidence to support the contention
that any cost savings was achieved by using wood.
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THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ROUNDHOUSE
VENTURE WAS A FAILUREf AND DEFENDANTS WERE
PRECLUDED FROM SHOWING THAT IT WAS A SUCCESS.
Plaintiffs claim at page 12 of their brief that the Arizona
"Roundhouse venture" was a "failure," and imply that that is the
reason Ong International got out.

In fact, when Defendants

attempted at trial to show what happened on the Roundhouse
venture at Pinetop, Arizona, Plaintiffs objected, stating:
"It's not part of any issues in this case." Consequently, the
court refused to allow Defendants' testimony concerning the
profitability of that venture.

(Tr. VIII:4350-52).

THE ELDER HANKS LOAN AND COY MILES STOCK CERTIFICATE,
The "paper evidencing Miles' share in the corporation"
(Appellees' Brief at 14) which Mr. Miles insisted that Hanks
accept as collateral for the $75,000.00 loan, was the stock
certificate, Exh. 53.
Reply Addendum).

(Tr. V:3739; a copy of Exh. 53 is in the

The back side of that stock certificate was

endorsed by Mr. Miles to Elder Hanks, as Elder Hanks testified at
trial.

(Tr. V:3749).

Moreover, Elder Hanks later accepted the

$75,000.00 paid by 11th Avenue Corporation and then gave the
mausoleum stock certificate to Mr. Garner. (Tr. V:3747).
DEFENDANTS NEVER DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS
OF PARTNERSHIP RECORDS.
All partnership records were readily available to Alldredge
before he signed the Redemption Agreement.
3285-86).

(Tr. 111:3248-50,

Alldredge hired independent accountants to audit the

mausoleum records before finalizing the terms of the Redemption
-11-

Agreement.

That audit resulted in a reduction in the considera-

tion agreed to be paid under the Agreement.

(Tr. 11:3055-56).

To do so, Alldredge had to have access to mausoleum partnership
records.

He could not have computerized the records without

the necessary information in hard-copy form to allow the
computerization.
When Defendants left the mausoleum premises and the
partnership terminated, Susan Stewart converted all mausoleum
partnership information stored in the computer to hard-copy form
for the benefit of Plaintiffs.

(Tr. IX:4620-21).

THERE WAS NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE
WOOD CRYPTS WERE NOT DURABLE AND OTHERWISE ADEQUATE.
Plaintiffs' expert Milne identified structural integrity
as the first and presumably most important factor in building
mausolea.

(Tr. IV:3573).

Milne never testified that the outdoor

pavilion crypts lacked these qualities, and volunteered that the
pavilion walls were adequately strong.

(Tr. IV:3603).

Although

Milne observed that 2 or 3 out of the 100 crypts he examined had
a slight bowing of wood panels, he did not know whether the
bowing was because the panels were not cut to a proper height, or
some other reason.

(Tr. IV:3624-26).

Contrary to Plaintiffs'

assertion that the woods used were "inferior" (Appellants' Brief
at 19), no witness ever so testified.
While Milne said that the interior dimensions of some crypts
were one or two inches short of what he recommended, he knew
caskets had been placed in the crypts. There was no evidence
-12-

that a casket would not fit within any crypt.

(Tr. IV:3602-3,

3628).
Milne admitted that in all of the 541 mausolea he had built,
he had never built a structure free from defects.

(Tr. IV:3623).

THE EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO CRYPT CUSTOMERS
IS MISREPRESENTED IN PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF.
Mr. and Mrs. Cummings did not purchase crypts on the second
story and were not angry about any transfer to the outdoor
pavilion, as claimed in Plaintiffs' brief at page 22. On the
page before that cited in support of this assertion, Sandra
Lenois admitted she was confused and that she had wrongly
identified Mr. and Mrs. Cummings on the two prior pages.

(Tr.

VI:3932-35).
The letter Ms. Lenois sent to Mr. and Mrs. Cummings
concerning crypts being pre-cast was based on information
she claimed to have received from Bob Ord, at a time before
construction on the crypts had begun.

(Tr. VI:3935).

The

information was neither shared with Mr. Garner nor provided by
him.

The suggestion that Mr. Garner should have told her to

discuss differences between the indoor and outdoor crypts is
merely Plaintiffs' conclusion and is not factually based.
VI:3936-8).
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(Tr.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that their agreement to the
release provisions of the Redemption Agreement was other than
knowing and voluntary.

Plaintiffs cannot point to one single

misrepresentation of the crypts or act of concealment after the
partnership was formed.

The Redemption Agreement was a result,

not a cause, of the disputes between the parties and, by its
clear language, was intended to resolve all disputes, whether
known or unknown.

The all-encompassing language was proposed by

Plaintiffs' attorney and could not have been part of any plan or
conspiracy to defraud Plaintiffs.

The release language should be

enforced according to its unambiguous terms to bar all of
Plaintiffs' claims.
Defendants have established that the trial court erred in
allowing irrelevant evidence and prejudicial argument regarding
Mrs. Garner's financial condition during the liability phase of
the trial. Appellees' brief fails to advance any valid argument
that the trial court properly allowed the wealth evidence and
refused to bifurcate the issue of punitive damages.
Absent enforcement of the release, a retrial is necessary
because of the prejudicial error resulting from premature
admission of evidence of Garner's wealth, and the several other
errors by the trial court below which prevented Defendants from
obtaining a fair trial before an impartial jury. Defendants'
objections to these errors were either adequately preserved, or
are reviewable under the plain error doctrine.
-14-

The trial court's analysis of the punitive damage award
was fatally flawed by reliance on an artificially inflated
restitution award.

The punitive award exceeded the guidelines

of Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 802 (Utah
1991), and cannot stand.

-15-

ARGUMENT
I.
THE GENERAL RELEASE PROVISIONS OF THE
REDEMPTION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED.
A.
Plaintiffs Admit That There Was No Representation
Congealing TheflfrtujreQf Construstion Qf The Outdoor Pavilion
Crypts During The Existence Of The Partnership.
As Plaintiffs admit, "at no time leading up to the
Redemption Agreement did Garner or anyone else for that matter,
make any statements to Ong or Alldredge regarding the wood
construction of the outdoor crypts."

(Appellees' Brief at 16).

In fact, Mr. Alldredge admitted at trial that during the
partnership Mr. Garner made no statement whatsoever to Alldredge
or to Ong "about the nature of the crypts in the outdoor
pavilion, that is to say, their construction or their design."
(Tr. 11:3050-51).
As we explained in AppeLlants' brief (14-18, and 35-36),
Plaintiffs' only evidence of any "fraudulent" misrepresentation
by Defendants are the statements that Plaintiffs claim Mr. Garner
made during the tours Garner gave them of the mausoleum premises
during 1987 and April of 1988, before the final partnership
agreement of the parties was signed and became effective.

There

is absolutely no evidence of any representation of the outdoor
crypts thereafter.

Neither is there any evidence of any attempt

by Defendants to conceal the wood nature of the crypts from
Plaintiffs during the partnership or thereafter.
More importantly, there was absolutely no evidence that
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Plaintiffs were tricked in any fashion into signing the
Redemption Agreement in March of 1989, including its release
provisions.

Plaintiffs merely protest that they still labored

under some misapprehension that the crypts of the outdoor
pavilion were built exactly the same as those of the indoor
mausoleum.

(Tr. 11:3001, 3007).

Yet, Mr. Alldredge was present

in October of 1988 when a wood crypt was opened and received
a coffin.
3288).

He participated in that activity.

(Tr. 111:3287-

Mr. Alldredge had adequate means and opportunity and

could have inspected the crypts had he chosen to do so.

A work

crew was not "required" to remove and replace marble facia
and open a crypt.

The laborer who installed the marble facia

testified he did it alone and without significant difficulty.
(Tr. IV:3468).

Alldredge was not prevented from inspecting any

crypts, and he cannot claim that he was.
Plaintiffs were not "fraudulently induced" into giving the
release.

The operative language of the release was inserted by

Plaintiffs' attorney and not Defendants'.

(Tr. VIII:4474).

Whether or not marshalled to Plaintiffs' satisfaction, the
evidence does not show that Plaintiffs' release of all claims
was "fraudulently procured."
B.
The Garner Appellants Did Not Owe A Fiduciary Duty To
Plaintiffs With Regard To The Negotiation And Execution Of The
Terns Qf Tfre Redemptjpn AgyQ^ment;.
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Garner owed a continuing
fiduciary responsibility to Plaintiffs at all times as to all
matters, past or present, because Plaintiffs and Garner had
-17-

joined together as joint venturers on a totally unrelated project
during at least part of the time Plaintiffs contend the wood
crypts were misrepresented.

They also argue that Mr, Garner was

a fiduciary to his partners on the mausoleum project when the
Redemption Agreement was negotiated,

(Appellees' Brief at 37).

These arguments do not bear the weight that Plaintiffs would
place upon them.
Partners owe each other a fiduciary duty with regard to
the business of the partnership which binds them to act for the
mutual good of the venture.

As to non-partnership matters, where

the partners adversarily deal with each other at arms-length,
there is no good reason to require any higher duty than that
existing between relative strangers, in the absence of special
circumstances which empower one of the parties to exercise
particular influence or special advantage over the other.

First

Security Bank of Utahf N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp., 7 86
P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1990).

Excluding fiduciary relationships

which arise from formal legal proceedings or from a contractual
relationship like that of attorney and client, fiduciary
responsibilities are not implied in law except where "the
factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the
relationship of the parties to each other and to the questioned
transactions," so demand.

EanberrX/ 786 P.2d at 1332 (emphasis

added) (quoting Dennison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684,
691-92, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (1982)).
Once the parties began negotiations to terminate their
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relationship as partners in 1989, there are two reasons why an
asserted fiduciary responsibility cannot apply:

(1) the several

actual disputes and concomitant destruction of trust between
the parties, which occurred no later than November of 1988; and
(2) the parties negotiated how to completely separate and to
terminate their relationship and not over how to operate or
to value their partnership.

Either circumstance made them

adversaries to each other in negotiating the terms of the
separation.

Fravega v. Security Savings & Loan Association,

192 N.J. Super. 213, 223, 469 A.2d 531, 536 (1983) (The standard
of utmost good faith between joint venturers logically should
not extend to transactions "where the relationship between the
parties is, by nature, adversarial" and each partner can be
expected to look out for his or her own interests); Walter v.
Holiday Innsr Inc.r 784 F.Supp. 1159, 1167-68 (D.N.J. 1992),
appeal pending, No. 92-5114 (3rd Cir. 1992) (A corporate partner
had no duty to disclose forecasts of the projected value of the
partnership to co-partner plaintiffs selling their partnership
interests to defendants).

Whatever "duty" existed before was

gone after Plaintiffs' and Defendants' relationship became
estranged and adversarial.

Id.

More importantly, any partnership information was reasonably
accessible to Plaintiffs.

Even if a fiduciary obligation of

disclosure were not abated by the adversarial posture of the
parties, Defendants still are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because:
-19-

It is a recognized exception to the common law duty
of full disclosure in partnership law that a partner
satisfies his fiduciary obligations if he makes all
information regarding the business of the partnership
available to his co-partners. [Citing, among other
authorities, Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah
1982), and Vestal, "'Ask Me No Questions and I'll Tell
You No Lies: Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure
Requirements Within High-Tech Joint Ventures'," 65
Tulane Law Rev. 705, 727-35 (1991).]
Walter v. Holiday Innsr Inc.,, 784 F.Supp. at 1171.

Here, there

is no evidence that Plaintiff Alldredge, who had officed at the
mausoleum for over eight months, was in any way prevented from
making any inspection or inquiry he wanted, including opening
any crypt to see its construction.
records.

He had access to corporate

(Tr. 111:3249-50, 3285-86).

And, it cannot be ignored

that Garner invited Alldredge* to assist at an entombment in a
wood crypt where the wood was plainly visible, but Alldredge
claims he failed to notice that fact.
C.
Defendants' Authorities Support Enforcement Of The
Release Provisions.
Plaintiffs attempt to confuse the issue argu€*d in Point I
of Appellants' brief by setting up the straw argument that
Appellants claimed these authorities were on "all fours" with the
present case.

We submit that a fair and reasonable reading of

Defendants' authorities show that they are not "airballs," but
rather "fair" balls.

Defendants' authorities accurately

represent and support the law for which they were cited in
Appellants' brief.

We do not claim that these cases represent

more, and Plaintiffs may not denigrate them as being less, than
they state.
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More importantly, Plaintiffs' effort to distinguish Ingram
Corp, v. J. Ray McDermott & Companyf Inc.f 698 F.2d 1295 (5th
Cir. 1983), cannot survive scrutiny.

Financially strained,

Ingram Corp. entered into a series of contracts with McDermott,
its largest competitor, whereby McDermott paid approximately $42
million to acquire Ingram's assets. By February 1972, various
disputes began to arise pertaining to the contracts between them.
The disputes touched a wide variety of legal and factual matters,
resulting in protracted settlement negotiations between the
parties and their counsel.

In May 1973, Ingram Corp. and

McDermott Company agreed to a complete settlement upon Ingram's
payment of $1.2 million to McDermott. As part of that settlement
agreement, the parties agreed to a comprehensive, mutual release
of all claims.
Over five years later, Ingram sued McDermott for antitrust
and RICO violations. McDermott defended based on the release.
As in this case, Ingram argued that the release had been procured
by fraud because McDermott had not disclosed its prior antitrust
conduct.

UL. at 1298-1302.

The Fifth Circuit Court held, as a matter of law, that the
district court erred in refusing to enforce the general releases
in favor of McDermott.

That court found that any nexus between

McDermott's alleged misrepresentations and attempt to hide its
antitrust conduct, and the later release negotiations was
"far too attenuated to be of probative value."

Id. at 1315.

McDermott's "silence as to possible antitrust claims is not the
-21-

same thing as fraudulent inducement,"

Id.

Finally, the court

held that the releases were c{ result/ not a cause, of the sale of
Ingram's assets to McDermott and were therefore not "part and
parcel" of any antitrust conspiracy.

Id.

The parallels between the Ingram case and the present matter
are striking and unavoidable.
First, there was a sale of "assets" to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that that sale (e.g.

partnership) would not have

occurred absent the alleged misrepresentations, which are
comparable to the antitrust violations of McDermott.

Soon after

the contract was entered into (here the Partnership Agreement),
disputes arose between the parties touching a wide variety of
issues.

Those disputes led to a loss of whatever trust may have

existed between the parties.
Each party was represented by separate legal counsel to
negotiate a resolution of th€>ir disputes. Like the McDermott
Company, Mr. Garner accepted the Plaintiffs' settlement offer to
buy out his interest in the partnership for approximately
one-half of its agreed value less than a year before.
Releases were given as part of the parties' settlement
agreement (i.e. the Redemption Agreement).

Later, the alleged

fraud as to events occurring prior to the original partnership
comes to light.

In both cases, the party crying "fraud" paid

cash or its equivalent to the other as part of the settlement and
release.
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The release of unknown claims is just as viable here as in
Ingram.

The release could not have been and was not part or

parcel of any conspiracy.

The release provision was proposed

by Plaintiffs' attorney because Plaintiffs voluntarily sought a
complete and final separation from Mr. Garner.
Any silence by Defendants about the nature of construction
of the outdoor crypts did not cause Plaintiffs to sign the
release.

It is not enough for Plaintiffs to say that they might

never have signed the release had they known.

Any possible nexus

between any earlier misrepresentations and the negotiated release
is too attenuated and lacks probative value.
As for Plaintiffs' "intent" argument, the release language
is clear and unambiguous.

Plaintiffs' intent is not at issue, as

both parties' "intent" should be interpreted from the contract's

own language,

plateau Mining Company vt Utah Division of State

Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); accord Barnett
v. Buchan Baking Company, 45 Wash.App. 152, 724 P.2d 1077, 1081
(1986), aff'd 108 Wash.2d 405, 738 P.2d 1056 (1987).

The court

should enforce the outward expression of the agreement, rather
than a party's unexpressed intention.

Winet v. Price, 4 Cal.

App. 4th 1159, 6 Cal. Rptr. 554, 558 (1992).

Even so, Exhibit

183 effectively belies Plaintiffs' later self-serving
protestations.
Plaintiffs knew they were signing a comprehensive release
and intended that release to extend to any and all unknown
claims.

(Exh. 183). Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel sought
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to carve out any exception for fraud claims at the time they
insisted upon the all-encompassing language.
The purpose of a release is to settle disputes.

The policy

favoring enforcement of releases, knowingly and voluntarily
signed, is wise and prudent.

To excuse Plaintiffs contravenes

the sanctity of contract terms knowingly proposed and accepted.
Plaintiffs may not have known every claim they had but they knew
they were giving up and releasing all claims, known and unknown.
If a mutual release of unknown claims has any efficacy at all in
modern jurisprudence, it must be enforced in this case.

Where

Plaintiffs specifically offered and agreed to release unknown
claims, that intent, clearly expressed in their agreement, cannot
now be opened up for reconsideration when they were not coerced,
deceived or "fraudulently induced" to sign the release.
Accordingly, the release* provisions of the Redemption
Agreement should be enforced as written to bar all of Plaintiffs'
claims.

The judgment should be reversed and entered in favor of

Defendants.
D,
Plaintiffs' Authority That The Release Is Unenforceable
Is Easily Distinguished.
The centerpiece of Plaintiffs' legal argument against the
enforceability of the releases is Lamb v. Bangartf 525 P. 2d 602
(Utah 1974), a case of alleged fraud in the sale of cattle.

There was T\Q written release and settlement agreement of any kind
involved in that case.

Plaintiffs Lamb claimed that the breeding

status and lineage of certain cattle had been misrepresented
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before execution of a sales contract, the only written agreement
between the parties.

Bangarts responded that a remedy provision

in the sale contract required Bangarts to share one-half of
their 1,500 ampules of semen with Lambs and that this was the
plaintiffs' exclusive remedy under the contract.

That limited

contractual remedy failed in its essential purpose because
Bangarts misrepresented the quantity of semen on hand.

The

remedy provision was not enforceable by Bangarts.
Plaintiffs Alldredge and Ong rely on the L&mk dictum that a
covenant of immunity will not protect a person against his own
fraud; and, "A contract limitation on damages or remedies is
valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud.''
Lambr 525 P.2d at 608. While this argument may well apply in
its proper context, neither the quote nor the case apply to the
present dispute where each party had many claims against and
disputes with the other, and mutually agreed to settle and
release all prior existing claims, known and unknown.

Lamb v.

Bangart is so far removed from the facts and law in this case
that the suggestion that the opinion is controlling in the
present dispute is meritless.
II.
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO REFER TO OR
SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS' FINANCIAL
CONDITION BEFORE A JURY FINDING OF LIABILITY.
Appellees' Brief does not respond to the persuasive
substance of Garner's arguments that due process, fairness and
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-1(2) (1992)
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required the trial court to exclude any reference to Defendants'
financial condition during the liability and damage phase of the
trial.

Instead, without any support from the record, Plaintiffs

captiously argue that the issue was waived prior to Defendants'
pretrial Second Motion in Limine (attached hereto in Reply
Addendum).
Appellees' diffused hyperbole is intended to distract this
Court from addressing the significant and compelling logic of
Appellants' brief.

Indeed, what better way to confuse and

distract the jury from the facts and merits of the case than to
continually hype that Mr. Garner is worth multi-millions in net
assets and can afford to give them to Appellees?

Schwartz,

"Challenging the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: Putting
Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy," 28 Amer. Bus. L.J.
485, 489 (Fall 1990).
Any attempt in this case to justify the trial court's
admission of wealth evidence in order to determine the punitive
damages at best comprises a "multiplicity of vague, overlapping
terms" that are inconsistently applied, due in part, to the
jury's wide, unfettered discretion.

The result "allows little

reason to believe that only deserving defendants are punished
or that actors have fair notice of the consequences of their
conduct."

Evidence of Defendants' financial condition only

enhances the "bias and redistributive inclinations of juries
which predictably influence outcomes . . .."

See Ellis,

"Punitive Damages, Due Process, and The Juries," 4 0 Ala. L. Rev.
-26-

975, 979 (1989).
Any legitimate purpose of punitive damages was not furthered
in this case by the evidence and commentary on Mr. Garner's
finances.

Under Plaintiffs' approach that "all's fair", perverse

incentives are created.
Uncertain criteria for determining the amount of an
assessment magnify the unfairness resulting from the
vagueness and variety of the liability criteria, invite
juries to indulge their biases and penchant for wealth
redistribution, and induce plaintiffs . . . to seek
punitive damages from defendants with "deep pockets"
rather than morally guilty persons.
Id.; See also, Ellis, "Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of
Punitive Damages," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 61-63 (1982).

To be

accorded a fair determination of liability and compensatory
damages, Garner should have received a trial of these issues
separate from any punitive considerations.

40 Ala. L. Rev. at

1003; See also the A.B.A. Report, Amer. Bar Assoc. Commission
to Improve the Tort Liability System:

Report to the House of

Delegates, pp. 18-19 (Feb. 1987).
This Court recognized that the lack of standards in punitive
damage determinations is a fundamental problem.

Crookston v.

Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 802 (Utah 1991).

Unlike

Appellees here, we do not view this Court's decision in Crookston
as a final placebo to all the vagaries and deficiencies long
perpetuated by exemplary damage awards.

The issues presented to

the Court today in this case were not argued, discussed or
decided in Crookston.

The Court is now provided an opportunity

for "further development" (Id. at 813) by recognizing Defendants'
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right to a fair determination of any liability untainted by a
jury's bias for or against irrelevant wealth.
As specifically demonstrated in Appellants' Brief (pp. 4255), Plaintiffs were permitted to aggressively bombard the jury
with evidence and argument of Mr. Garner's wealth.

Defendants

did not "put wealth in issue." Plaintiffs' record citations do
not support their attempt to shift responsibility for this
maneuver.

Defendants' in limine motion to preclude all such

references was denied.

Plaintiffs introduced and perpetuated

the issue, beginning with their opening statement that "Mr.
Garner . . . is a multimillionaire, has a net worth of over—way
over seven million dollars, and we [Plaintiffs] will ask you, the
jury, for a finding that there ought to be exemplary punitive
damages . . .."

(Tr. 1:2919; see also Tr. V:3712-16).

The issue

of Mr. Garner's wealth, regardless of its evidentiary source, was
presented and perpetuated by Plaintiffs, not by Defendants.
The pettiness of Plaintiffs' excuses is exampled by the
admission of Mrs. Garner's tax information with Mr. Garner's.
(Appellees' Brief at 68).

Plaintiffs excuse this irrelevant,

prejudicial evidence because the trial judge told Garner that he
had had several months' "notice" prior to trial to voluntarily
separate the tax information for the Plaintiffs.
36).

(Tr. VII:4232-

Such reasoning makes as much sense as telling Defendants

that they are responsible for the admissibility of Plaintiffs'
evidence.

Defendants did not have the burden to assure that

Plaintiffs' exhibits or evidence were relevant and admissible.
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Whatever excuse Plaintiffs ascribe to the evidence of Mrs.
Garner's wealth is wholly without merit.

The trial court's

ruling was unjustifiable and is a further example of the court's
abuse of Defendants during the trial proceedings. And, see
Chamberlain vf Cherry, 818 S.W. 2d 201, 206 (Tex. App. 1991) (a
tax return shows only current income and not a defendant's
general wealth or present financial condition).
Plaintiffs vainly dismiss Defendants' argument on punitive
damages with the same &d hominem tactic employed at trial —

in

essence, that unrestricted wealth evidence "has long been the
practice in Utah" and Defendants do not have any Utah case that
says Plaintiffs cannot.

(Appellees' Brief at 49-50).

Whether

or not Utah juries have ever properly heard evidence of a
defendant's wealth at the same time as it considered the issues
of liability and compensatory damages is not a matter of record
in this case. There is no. Utah authority that has ever
considered or countenanced such a procedure.

This issue of

first impression allows this Court to correct past vagaries and
remedy perpetuated errors of bygone trial procedures. The
argument that because of past practice, fairness, due process,
and Section 78-18-1(2) are as dross makes as much sense here as
to perpetuate a deadman's statute, guest statute, a statute of
repose, or even the old rules of code pleading for the same
reason.
Plaintiffs criticize Defendants for raising "new arguments
on appeal that were not argued below."
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(Appellees' Brief at 47,

n. 21; 49, n. 24). Plaintiffs mistakenly attempt to equate
"issues" with "arguments."

Prior to trialf Defendants filed

their "Second Motion in Limine" (Reply Add., R. 2:845-47) to
preclude any evidence or reference to the relative wealth and
financial condition of any party until after a determination of
liability.

In their supporting memorandum, Defendants argued

that such references and evidence were irrelevant, prejudicial
and in contravention of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-1(2) (1992).
The same issues were again placed before the trial judge in
Defendants' motion for new trial and/or remittitur of damages.
(Post Verdict Motion, R. 5:1920-22).
The issue of the prejudicial admission of wealth evidence
before any determination of liability was clearly and properly
raised and preserved below.

Defendants submit that their further

arguments on appeal in support of this same issue are appropriate
and compelling.

An appellant is not limited merely to the

precise argument made below.
Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992).

Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.

Such a miserly approach denigrates the

value of appellate review.
Plaintiffs also excuse the lower court's error by asserting
an alleged waiver of the issue dehors the record.
Brief at 48-50).

(Appellees'

We observe that Plaintiffs do not provide any

record support for their claim because there is none.

Nowhere in

the record did Defendants ever "agree" that Section 78-18-1(2)
does not apply to this case. And, we affirmatively reject
Plaintiffs' misguided perception of any extra-record matter.
-30-

If, as Plaintiffs claim, there was some "agreement" before
Defendants' Second Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs surely would have
so argued in their responsive memoranda before the trial court.
No such contention has ever been made by Plaintiffs until now.
This new "waiver" claim was never made below.

(Plffs' Memo, in

Oppos., R. 3:1263-68; Ong's Answering Memo., R. 6:2201-2).

There

is no merit to it.
We submit that the considered and persuasive decisions of
the respected courts of other states, Campen v. Stoner 635 P.2d
1121 (Wyo. 1981) and Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D. 2d 265, 368
N.Y. S.2d 904 (1975), remain untouched by Plaintiffs.

Neither

have Plaintiffs even attempted to address the considerable
deficiencies of the trial court's intermingling of liability
and wealth evidence.
The concerns and deficiencies discussed by these courts and
by legal scholars are significant.
response thereto.

Plaintiffs have no cogent

Defendants' authorities and arguments in

Appellants' Brief at 41-55, remain unrefuted.

The public policy,

rationale, and legislative intent behind Section 78-18-1(2)
are clear.

This Court should not adopt an awkward stance in

direct contravention of the purpose and merits of the statute.
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah
1990).
There was absolutely no need for the jury to know anything
about Defendants' alleged wealth during the trial of the issues
of liability and damages.

Such evidence and references were, and
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aref irrelevant and prejudicial.

The repeated references to and

evidence of wealth is reversible error.

Whether by exercise of

its own inherent power to control the trial and assure fairness
to all parties, or by statutory application, the trial court
should have bifurcated the trial and excluded evidence of
Defendants' wealth during the liability phase of the case. Cf.
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988).

As a matter of

law, this Court should reverse the trial courts' ruling for its
refusal to do so.
III.
THE GARNER DEFENDANTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT
TO APPEAL THE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE AWARD.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants waived their right to
contest an award of compensatory damages.
51).

(Appellees' Brief at

That argument misconstrues both the record and the law.
When Plaintiffs started examining their expert accountant

about Exhibits 89 and 90, Defendants did not stipulate to the
admission of Exhibits 89 and 90, purporting to explain their
damages, but only that the expert witness would testify to the
numbers thereon.

Defendants did agree that Plaintiffs must lay

a foundation for those exhibits through the testimony of their
expert accountant, but would be allowed to show the exhibits
to the jury during the examination.

(Tr. VII:4138-39).

Near

the end of Plaintiffs' direct examination concerning those
exhibits, Defendants objected for lack of proper foundation
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and for speculation, and moved to strike the testimony,

(Tr.

VII:4167-70).
Later in his testimony, Plaintiffs' expert admitted that
a prejudgment interest factor was added only at the direction
of Plaintiffs' attorney and not by the experts' independent
judgment.

He had never read the statute or interpreting cases

to even consider whether that factor was appropriate.
VII:4173-74).

(Tr.

And, we submit, any amount for an investment

rate of return, or consequential damages, was based only on
Plaintiffs' subjective expectations and not upon any objective,
credible evidence.

(Tr. VII:4219-23).

Finally, Defendants also moved for a directed verdict on the
issue of prejudgment interest, particularly under the rescission
claim, citing Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah
1989).

In connection therewith, Defendants also excepted to the

jury instruction that allowed the jury to include a rate of
return.

(Tr. X:4719; see proposed Instr. 29, final Instr. 48;

R. 5:1848).
The jury verdict form did not define the term "consequential
damages," but relied on instruction 48 to inform the jury what
the term meant.

Defendants' objection to the instruction was all

that was necessary to preserve this issue for appeal.
tiffs' cited authorities are inapposite.

Plain-

(Appellants' Brief at

51).
Also, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention (Appellees' Brief
at 60) that Ong International was required to "pour operating
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capital" money into the mausoleum, the record is entirely devoid
of any suggestion that Plaintiff Ong was so required.

The record

does evidence that Ong International spent substantial sums, both
before and after Plaintiffs claim they discovered the wood
crypts, for which Plaintiffs did not obtain any significant
return because of their poor management decisions resulting in a
substantial net loss in 1989 and 1990.
IX:4522).

(e.g. Exh. 47; Tr.

These expenditures and Plaintiffs' loss were not a

"consequence" of any representations by Mr. Garner and were
unrelated to the physical condition of any crypts.

Even if

Defendants are held liable, the jury improperly rewarded
Plaintiffs for their own mismanagement.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INAPPROPRIATE COMMENTS
DURING TRIALf IDENTIFIED IN PLAINTIFFS' OPENING
BRIEF, ARE REVIEWABLE AS PLAIN ERROR.
Plaintiffs contend, at pages 64-65 of their brief, that
Defendants waived any objection to the court's gratuitous and
disparaging remarks described in Point III.B.2. of Appellants'
Brief, at pp. 63-65, 68-69.

Defendants respectfully submit that

those matters are reviewable under the doctrine of ''plain error."
"Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to
the attention of the court."

Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d).

As explained in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989),
(1) the error needs to be sufficiently plain that the appellate
court "must be able to say that it should have been obvious to a
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trial court that it was committing error;" and (2) "the error [in
this case the cumulative errors] affects the substantial rights
of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful."
(citations omitted).

Id. at 35

The degree of objective obviousness

necessary to invoke the plain error rule varies inversely with
the degree of harm.

Id. at 36, n. 11.

In this case, everyone agrees that the evidence was sharply
contrasting and critically divided as to whether Garner
misrepresented the construction of the outdoor crypts. Either
Garner did not misrepresent that matter (as he, Burtis Evans and
Susan Stewart testified), or he did (as David Alldredge and Ong
Ka Thai testified).

Credibility was, and is, crucial. Thus,

anything said or done by the trial judge that reasonably could
be perceived by a juror to express the judge's opinion on
credibility matters would receive greater significance.

The

court's frequent commentary tipped the scales against the
prejudiced party, notwithstanding a brief stock instruction,
buried in the pile, that the jury determines the credibility of
witnesses.

Such a stock instruction was neither prophylactic

nor curative, especially coming at the end of the case after the
jurors had solidified their impressions of the witnesses and
evidence.
We submit that the trial judge knew at the outset that the
evidence was hotly contested and that anything affecting
credibility could be both critical and outcome-determinative.
Against this background, Defendants submit that the court's
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several unsolicited comments satisfy the "obviousness" portion of
the plain error test.
With regard to the second prong of that test, that the error
affect "substantial rights," the court's erroneous rulings and
comments on credibility resulted in a multi-million dollar
judgment - a substantial impact on Defendants' rights.

Jurors

are quick to attend a judge's interruption and attach importance
and meaning never intended.

State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 523,

145 P. 470, 473-74 (1915) .
Between the contrary winds of advocacy, a juror would
not be a man if he did not, in some of the distractions
of mind which attend a hard-fought and doubtful case,
grasp the words and manner of the judge as a guide to
lead him out of his perplexity. On the other hand, a
presiding judge has no way to measure the effect of his
interruption. The very fact that he takes a witness
away from the attorney for examination may, in the
tense atmosphere of the trial, lead to great prejudice.
id.

Accord, ggede-NjgsQn v, Crystal Mountain, Inci^ 606 p.2d

1214, 1223 (Wash. 1980).

Unsolicited comments from the trial court suggested that
Defendants may have attempted to defraud the Internal Revenue
Service.

(Tr. V:3700).

Such a comment is clearly prejudicial

and satisfies the requirements of plain error.

Likewise, we

submit that the court's harsh criticisms of witnesses Garner and
Dr. Burtis Evans exceeded reasonable propriety and judicial
demeanor by unnecessarily lecturing them on their testimony.

We

contend that the court's attitude and prominence suggested to the
jurors that the witnesses were inherently not credible.
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Finally, the trial court inappropriately demeaned
Defendants' expert, Professor Schroeder, by suggesting that Dr.
Schroeder was trying to show that Plaintiffs "got a bargain,"
thereby signaling to jurors that the professor was not to be
trusted.
In short, these unsolicited judicial comments were harmful
and were reasonably likely to have influenced the jury's
perceptions and result.

These errors are entitled to be reviewed

along with the other assignments of error identified by
Defendants at pages 61-71 of their brief.
[T]he test used for determining an error's harmfulness
is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that absent
the error a different result would have occurred. This
determination should be made on the basis of the record
as a whole. In the instant case, the determination is
best made by viewing this error in conjunction with
other errors which occurred during the trial . . ..")
[footnote omitted].
State v. Emmettr 184 Ut.Adv.Rep. 34, 35 (Utah 1992).

As in

Emmettf the trial court's errors here impacted the Defendants'
credibility and character, which were at the heart of their
defense, and resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a different
result absent the assigned errors. The same reasoning requires a
similar result in the present case.
The comments of the trial court here complained of could not
have been reasonably anticipated.

Any objection at the time

would have been futile. Continual objections would not have
further alerted the trial court to what it had already just said,
and would only have further cemented in the minds of the jurors
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the content and prejudicial nature of the court's comment.
Nothing goes further to disturb the proper trial atmosphere than
reiterated insistence upon a position contrary to the judge's
pronounced views, Cf t Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d
515, 519 (2nd Cir.), cert, den. 343 U.S. 966 (1952).
V.
THE TRIAL COURT'S COLLECTIVE AND
CUMULATIVE ERRORS REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL.
The accumulation of error requires retrial even when no
single error alone would so mandate, where "the cumulative effect
of the several errors undermines our confidence that defendants
were able to present to the jury their theory of the case and
that a fair trial was had."

Whitehead yf American MQtpy Sales

Corp.f 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990).

The court's reasoning in

Whitehead is instructive because of its similarity to Defendants'
problems here:
In the instant case, the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence offered by defendants. That evidence
was necessary to rebut the assertions that plaintiffs
made to establish liability. This error was compounded
by unduly restricting the scope of defendants' crossexamination. Given the conflicting testimony presented
on this key issue, we cannot say that the substantial
rights of defendants were not affected by the combined
effects of the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and
the limitation of cross-examination.
Id. at 928.
Similarly, as detailed in Appellants' brief, the trial court
here erroneously excluded important testimony of Dr. Schroeder
which went to the materiality of the crypts having been built
of wood.

That evidence was necessary to rebut the assertions
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Plaintiffs made concerning the contended inadequacy of the wood
crypts to establish Defendants' liability.
The court's unduly restrictive rulings prohibited Defendants
from adequately exploring the bias of Steve Nielson and Sandra
Lenois.

The trial judge's disparaging comments during the

testimony of witnesses Keith Garner, Robert Ord, Dr. Herbert
Schroeder, Dr. Larry Reaveley, and Dr. Burtis Evans, all as
explained in Appellants' Brief at 61-71, undermined the
reliability of the jury's verdict. Given the conflicting
testimony, credibility was critical to the jury's consideration
of the evidence and was compromised by the trial judge's partisan
approach.

The combined effect of the erroneous exclusion of

evidence and the limitation of examination requires reversal and
remand for a new trial.
CONCLUSION

The issues in this appeal challenge the trial court's
rulings as matters of law - and not facts. Extensive
"marshaling" of all of the trial evidence is not required to
establish the reversible errors below.

Even so, Plaintiffs'

"marshaled facts" are unreliable and should be disregarded.
There was no evidence in the record of any fraudulent
inducement or procurement of the Redemption Agreement with its
release provisions.

Those release provisions, inserted by

Plaintiffs' attorney and negotiated at arms-length, are clear and
comprehensive and should be enforced to bar all of Plaintiffs'
claims.

The judgments entered below should be vacated and
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reversed, with an instruction to the trial court to dismiss all
of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.
Absent outright dismissal, the case should be remanded for
a new trial, bifurcating trial of the issues of liability and
compensatory damages from Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages.
The trial court's refusal to bifurcate and the numerous other
errors in the aggregate solidly cement Defendants' entitlement to
a new trial, as a matter of Law.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1992.

/" .

Arthur H. Nielsen
John K. Mangum
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.

(A

Uark R. Nielser
ofSHENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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I hereby certify that on the 31st day of July, 1992, I
served upon Plaintiffs/Appellees four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF by causing them to be hand-delivered
to the following:
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq,
Clark W. Sessions, Esq,
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
13th Floor, One Utah Center
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Addendum 1

Arthur H. Nielsen, USB No. A2405
Gary A. Weston, USB No. 3435
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC., a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.'
ALLDREDGE, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v«

)
)

DEFENDANTS1 SECOND MOTION
IN LIMINE

)
)
)

11TH AVENUE CORPORATION, a Btah )
corporation, f/k/a Salt Lake
Memorial Mausoleum; and
)
KEITH E. GARNER, an individual,
)
Defendants.

Civil No.

900904288CN

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants move the Court for an order with regard to the
trial of this case:
1.

Prohibiting the offer of evidence of relative wealth

and financial condition or circumstance of any party unless and
until the Court has received a preliminary finding from the jury
that punitive damages should be awarded or said evidence is
relevant to a claim or defense other than for punitive damages.
13522

C00845

2.

Precluding

disclosing,

opening

addressing

or

statements

making

to

reference

the

jury

from

to the finances,

financial statements, investments and businesses, and any other
condition

or circumstance of

the relative wealth of a party,

which disclosure or reference

is made relative to a claim for

punitive damages or which would otherwise be precluded by the
Court absent a claim for punitive damages against that party.
3.

Determining that the Court, in its charge to the jury,

shall not disclose that a portion of any punitive damages awarded
in the case may be remitted to the State Treasurer for deposit
into the General Fund as provided by §78-18-1(3), Utah Code Ann.
4.

Excluding

the 'opinion

or

conclusion

of any

expert

witness with regard to the market for the sale of wood crypts,
the

ability

to sell wood

crypts, and/or

the conditions

and

circumstances necessary to market wood crypts or the effect that
wood

crypts

marketing
foundation

in the Salt

Lake Memorial Mausoleum may have on

of concrete crypts
is preliminarily

therein, except where

laid establishing

sufficient

that said expert

witness has offered and marketed wood crypts for sale, attempted
to

so

offer

investigation

and
of

market, or

has made

the marketability

of

a sufficient
wood

study

crypts, or

or
has

reasonably relied upon such a study or investigation in arriving
at such opinion or conclusion.
Defendants herewith submit their memorandum of points and
authorities.

13522
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DATED this 31st day of July, 1991.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Defendants
Suite7 1100r Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 5 32-1900

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify
served
causing

the
a

that on this 31st day of July, 1991, I

foregoing

DEFENDANTS'

true

correct

and

copy

SECOND MOTION
thereof

to

IN LIMINE by
be

personally

delivered to the following:
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq.
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq.
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Courtesy Copy:
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Addendum 3

Ms/i&L

MARION n. HANKS

;

TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY

MARION D. HANKS
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